3CX Desktop App Compromised (CVE-2023-29059)
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This is a developing story. Please check back for the latest updates from FortiGuard Labs. For a detailed report of this event, please visit our Threat Signal Reports page.
On March 29, a number of reports surfaced that a legitimate signed file from VoIP/IP PBX solutions provider 3CX (3CXDesktop App) had been trojanized due to a code-level compromise. This is the latest high-profile supply chain attack, beginning with SolarWinds and Kaseya a few years ago. This issue has been assigned CVE-2023-29059.
3CXDesktop App is a multi-platform softphone application for desktops (Linux, MacOS, and Windows). The 3CXDesktop App allows users to interact via chat, messaging, video, and voice. Initial reports suggested that all platforms of the 3CXDesktop App were compromised. But at the time of writing, it appears that only the Electron framework versions of MacOS (versions 18.11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407, and 18.12.416) and Windows (versions 18.12.407 and 18.12.416) of the 3CX Desktop App are affected. 3CX has stated that they are working on a new version of the Windows app and have revoked the certificate for the previous version. Initially, there was some confusion about whether the MacOS version was affected, as the CEO of 3CX issued a statement that only the Windows version of the app was affected. However, this statement was later retracted. Currently, no status on the availability of the MacOS version has been provided at the time of writing.
The company’s website boasts that 3CX is available in over 190 countries worldwide, with over 12 million daily users and a 600,000-plus customer base. Companies listed on its website include high-profile organizations in the automobile, aerospace, finance, food and beverage, government, hospitality, and manufacturing sectors, to name a few.
The trojanized 3CX Desktop App is part of a multi-stage attack that utilizes a malicious sideloaded DLL (ffmpeg.dll – SHA256: 7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896) that contains instructions and a payload within another DLL via an encrypted blob (d3dcompiler_47.dll – SHA256: 11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03). This blob also contains the shellcode, which tries to pull ICO files from GitHub (currently down) that contain various URIs for download, where the payload is ultimately loaded and installed to the target environment. However, we could not confirm further details as the repository is currently down.
Discovery of Two 3CXDesktopApp.exes – but Only One Sideloads the Malicious DLL
Looking at the Windows installer (SHA256:aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868), it drops TWO 3CXDesktopApp.exe files.
The SECOND (inside app-18.12.407 folder) is the one that sideloads the ffmpeg.dll file.
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Programs\3CXDesktopApp\3CXDesktopApp.exe
Filesize: 541KB
MD5: 08d79e1fffa244cc0dc61f7d2036aca9
SHA1: 480dc408ef50be69ebcf84b95750f7e93a8a1859
SHA256: 54004dfaa48ca5fa91e3304fb99559a2395301c570026450882d6aad89132a02
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Programs\3CXDesktopApp\app-18.12.407\3CXDesktopApp.exe
Filesize: 142MB
MD5: bb915073385dd16a846dfa318afa3c19
SHA1: 6285ffb5f98d35cd98e78d48b63a05af6e4e4dea
SHA256: dde03348075512796241389dfea5560c20a3d2a2eac95c894e7bbed5e85a0acc
What Mitigations Are Available?
3CX suggests that users migrate to the PWA app in the meantime. The PWA app is web-based and is unaffected by the supply chain attack. Customers on 3CXHosted and StartUP are not affected. Additional details on updates and best practices can be found here. FortiGuard Labs suggests that all older variants of the 3CX Desktop App be discontinued immediately until newer unaffected versions are available.
What is the Status of Coverage?
Fortinet Customers running the latest definitions are protected by the following AV signatures:
W64/Agent.CFM!tr
OSX/Agent.CN!tr
W64/Sphone_XC3.INFS!tr.dldr
All known network IOCs related to this attack are blocked by the WebFiltering client. For a detailed overview of all Fortinet protections for this event, please visit our Outbreak Alerts page.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) |
Hash/Detections
|
|
|
aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
59e1edf4d82fae4978e97512b0331b7eb21dd4b838b850ba46794d9c7a2c0983 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61 |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed314290 |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
92005051ae314d61074ed94a52e76b1c3e21e7f0e8c1d1fdd497a006ce45fa61 |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
5407cda7d3a75e7b1e030b1f33337a56f293578ffa8b3ae19c671051ed314290 |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
b86c695822013483fa4e2dfdf712c5ee777d7b99cbad8c2fa2274b133481eadb |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec |
SHA2 |
OSX/Agent.CN!tr |
|
c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
c485674ee63ec8d4e8fde9800788175a8b02d3f9416d0e763360fff7f8eb4e02 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
B5E318240401010E4453E146E3E67464DD625CFEF9CD51C5015D68550EE8CC09 |
SHA2 |
W64/Agent.CFM!tr |
|
AA4E398B3BD8645016D8090FFC77D15F926A8E69258642191DEB4E68688FF973 |
SHA2 |
W64/Sphone_XC3.INFS!tr.dldr |
Network IOCs
|
akamaicontainer[.]com |
|
akamaitechcloudservices[.]com |
|
azuredeploystore[.]com |
|
azureonlinecloud[.]com |
|
azureonlinestorage[.]com |
|
dunamistrd[.]com |
|
glcloudservice[.]com |
|
journalide[.]org |
|
msedgepackageinfo[.]com |
|
msstorageazure[.]com |
|
msstorageboxes[.]com |
|
officeaddons[.]com |
|
officestoragebox[.]com |
|
pbxcloudeservices[.]com |
|
pbxphonenetwork[.]com |
|
pbxsources[.]com |
|
qwepoi123098[.]com |
|
sbmsa[.]wiki |
|
sourceslabs[.]com |
|
visualstudiofactory[.]com |
|
zacharryblogs[.]com |
|
akamaicontainer[.]com |
|
akamaitechcloudservices[.]com |
|
azuredeploystore[.]com |
|
azureonlinecloud[.]com |
|
azureonlinestorage.com |
|
convieneonline[.]com |
|
dunamistrd[.]com |
|
glcloudservice[.]com |
|
journalide[.]org |
|
msedgepackageinfo[.]com |
|
msstorageazure[.]com |
|
msstorageboxes[.]com |
|
officeaddons[.]com |
|
officestoragebox[.]com |
|
pbxcloudeservices[.]com |
|
pbxphonenetwork[.]com |
|
pbxsources[.]com |
|
qwepoi123098[.]com |
|
Soyoungjun[.]com |
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